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Introduction 
 
In February 2012, the largest demonstrations in Russia’s post-Soviet period took place 
when at least 20, 000 protestors descended on Moscow disputing the re-election of 
Vladimir Putin as president for a third term (Parfitt, 2012). The protests reignited the 
academic debate surrounding the state of civil society in contemporary Russia. The 
accepted view of Russian society was one which would accept the restrictions on 
political rights in return for economic security. Yet the 2012 protests demonstrated 
that Russia’s middle class was increasingly looking outside securing its own immediate 
needs and engaging in politics, and that contrary to popular narratives, there was a 
burgeoning civil society which was willing to act as a bulwark against the state 
(Chebankova, 2013). The response of the state to these protests has been to place 
serious restrictions on civil society through legal and financial pressure, and it has 
become increasingly hostile towards non-governmental organisations (NGO) and 
particularly human rights organisations.  
Yet despite open confrontation between the state and the civil society, Russia is not a 
completely authoritarian state. Most academic literature places Russia as a hybrid 
regime: a state which incorporates both democratic and authoritarian characteristics 
However, as Levitsky and Way outline in their seminal work The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism, the classification of ‘hybrid regime’ is too broad a concept, and 
those states which can be considered ‘hybrid regimes’ exhibit a wide range of 
characteristics which they may not necessarily share with other hybrid regimes 
(Levitsky and Way, 2005). Instead they posit Russia as a specific type of hybrid 
regime. In this definition, formal democratic institutions exist but are frequently 
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manipulated by incumbents as they are viewed as “the principal means of obtaining 
and exercising political authority” (Levitsky and Way, 2002:52). The violations of free 
and fair elections, as well as political and civil rights “are both frequent and serious 
enough to create an uneven playing field between government and opposition” 
(Levitsky and Way, 2002:53). Herein lies the crux of competitive authoritarianism. 
Though the playing field may be uneven, it still exists and while democratic 
institutions may be weakened, they are still arenas where opposition forces can pose 
challenges to the state (Levitsky and Way, 2002).  
Therefore, there remain spaces within which non-governmental organisations and 
subsequently human rights organisations are able to work and co-operate with the 
state. In 2007, it was estimated that there were over 600,000 registered non-
governmental organisations working in Russia (Klitsounova,2008: 2). Although exact 
figures are hard to establish, in 2001 it was estimated that approximately 5.2 per cent 
of those non-governmental organisations were human rights organisations, 
constituting around 19,500 groups (Klitsounova,2008: 2).  
The contradiction between the authoritarian style legislation that has been introduced 
in Russia in the past years and the apparent growth in non- governmental 
organisations has become the foundation of this thesis. Following from the 
introduction of the NGO law in 2006 which stipulated the re-registering of non-
governmental organisations, this thesis seeks to examine the period from 2006 until 
the present day in Russia and whether human rights organisations are able to continue 
working in Russia in the current climate. I focus particularly on human rights 
organisations for several reasons. Human rights organisations in Russia are 
particularly portrayed as working against the state’s interests, and new legislation 
seriously limits their abilities to report and expose human rights abuses in Russia. 
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Most external reports on the new legislation has therefore been concerned with the 
negative effects of changes to human rights organisations in Russia (Amnesty 
International, 2007; Amnesty International, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2016b; 
Human Rights Watch, 2016c; International Federation for Human Rights, 2015; 
International Federation on Human Rights, 2014). Human rights organisations, more 
so than other non-governmental organisations, therefore have to be able to deftly 
maneuver between the state’s autocratic and democratic tendencies in order to ensure 
their survival. Drawing on the experiences of two different human rights organisations, 
the Union of the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers and the Committee Against Torture, 
along with existing academic literature and other primary sources, this thesis will 
explore if human rights organisations can balance the democratic and autocratic 
contradictions in Russia and continue to work effectively.  It will argue that due to the 
hybrid nature of the Russian state, it is still possible for human rights organisations to 
take advantages of the pockets of space and continue their work.  However, the 
severity of legislation, particularly since 2012, has placed a significant burden on 
Russian human rights organisations. It now appears that human rights organisations 
can only work on issues which the state deems to be a priority.  Without a relaxation of 
legislation on non-governmental organisations and foreign funding, it is highly 
unlikely that professionalized human rights organisations will be able to grow and 
develop the necessary networks and skills to sufficiently present a challenge to the 
state. It is therefore likely that the landscape of the human rights community will 
slowly change so that there are a few large independent human rights organisations, 
but will be dominated mainly by government- supported organisations which serve the 
state but do not challenge it.  
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OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
The thesis will first briefly examine the literature surrounding Russian civil society and 
examine common themes and academic arguments which emerge. Using the existing 
literature, it will demonstrate how the spheres of space, funding and activism interact 
and form Russian civil society.  
Chapter Two will outline the methodology used in order to answer the research 
question and provide details on the two organisations used in gaining empirical 
evidence to support the research.  
Chapter Three will begin the start of the analysis of three spheres of interest, and 
will examine the top down approach to delineate the space in which human rights 
organisations are able to work. This section focuses primarily on legislation changes, 
but also areas where there is state-society cooperation.  
Chapter Four will conversely examine human rights organisations at a grassroots 
level, and how cultural practices and the Soviet legacy impact the capabilities of 
human rights organisations in Russia.  
Chapter Five will add the final part of the analysis. This chapter will focus on the 
funding of non-governmental organisations and, consequently human rights 
organisations. The most controversy has been generated regarding the foreign funding 
of NGOs, and while this forms a large part of the chapter, it also looks at domestic 
funding options such as state provision, corporate giving and individual donations.   
This thesis ends by highlighting the key findings of the research. It is important to 
emphasis that the intention of this thesis should not be considered as an absolute 
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answer to the research question posed, but rather as a small intersectional 
examination of Russian human rights organisations which can add knowledge about 
some of the challenges that human rights organisations in Russia face and how they 
can continue to work in a difficult environment. It is only by understanding these 
challenges better that it is possible to support such organisations in a more effective 
manner. 
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Chapter One: Literature Review  
CIVIL SOCIETY 
The term ‘civil society’ itself is a broad term and merits a brief examination before 
looking to Russian civil society specifically. Philosophical concepts of civil society draw 
on ideas proposed by John Locke, Rousseau and de Tocqueville who used concepts of 
civil society in their own theories of social evolution (Greene, 2014). Theoretical 
conceptions of civil society have become increasingly complex and nuanced, however it 
can be said that in general terms civil society has come to be understood as the third 
sphere between the two other spheres of state and private life and to serve as a 
counterweight to the state.  Thus, Richter defines civil society as  
 “the space where overlapping networks of autonomous voluntary associations-
formal and informal, political and non-political-create the space for public action 
between the individual and the state” (Richter, 2002:30) 
Within this definition, human rights organisations, sports organisations, bird watching 
associations and parent-toddler groups are all part of the civil society space. In 
addition to being independent of government working to promote citizenship, 
Chebankova adds further prerequisites for a civil society. She argues that a vibrant 
associational life can exist in less desirable forms such as criminal gangs and 
fundamentalist organisations, and therefore takes a Kantian view that civil society 
should promote positive ideals such as equality and “be active in the dissemination of 
its ideals of the good life in the public domain” (Chebankova, 2013:2) 
In addition, civil society is thought to be an important condition for the development 
of a democratic state (Henderson, 2003; Linz and Stepan, 1996;). Eberly goes as far to 
say that “the development of democratic nations is simply not possible without the 
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underpinnings of a robust civil society” (Eberly, 2008:215). Civil society supports 
democratic development in two ways.  Firstly, it encourages “habits of cooperation, 
solidarity, public-spiritedness, and trust. Externally, these networks then aggregate 
interests and articulate demands to ensure the government’s accountability to its 
citizens” (Henderson, 2002:140).  
RUSSIAN CIVIL SOCIETY  
There is a broad consensus between academic literature and Western human rights 
organisations that the state of Russian civil society is weak and underdeveloped with a 
considerable state presence. It has been under Putin that the concept of civil society 
has become an important part of state discourse and a focus for the Kremlin. The 
adoption of the ‘NGO law’ in 2006 marked the point from when the Kremlin began to 
take an active interest in civil society and how it was formed.  
Putin has repeatedly emphasized the importance of civil society in Russia, and has 
frequently assured Russian citizens and governments abroad that Russia values an 
independent and robust civil society (Putin, 2004; Putin, 2012). However, academics 
have noted that state actions in Russia rarely match the overtures made in public. 
Many have concluded that Putin’s concept of civil society is consistent with his concept 
of the “vertical of power”, whereby civil society “acts as an executive auxiliary of the 
state”, rather than as an independent sector (Salmenniemi, 2014; Daucé 2010). The 
Russian state has therefore continued to extend its participation in civil society 
through the regulations of civic activism and creating different restrictions and 
opportunities for those who are allies to those who are considered adversaries 
(Lyytikäinen, 2013).  
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However, Russia is not a totalitarian state. Unlike other countries such as Uzbekistan 
where it is not possible for any kind of effective civil dissent, Russian civil society does 
possess some independence agency as shown by the protests in 2012, and other anti-
government protests which have happened in the country, focusing on issues such as 
pensions, salaries and tax. The key reason for this independency originates from the 
desire of the Russian state to be perceived as a legitimate, democratic state. Vladimir 
Surkov’s proposal for “sovereign democracy” in Russia, a special hybrid regime 
ideology which would promote the liberal democratic values of the West while 
maintaining a strong state control. In practice, this has meant that the state has largely 
suppressed those which directly challenge it, while facilitating and supporting those 
groups that are more co-operative.  
 As a result, Russian civil society has developed in a unique and unanticipated way. It 
has been influenced by the presence of Western funding and information transmission 
between different groups, yet the state effectively manages it, despite its desire to 
appear to be a democratic state. For human rights organisations, they provide an 
indirect form of contestation to Putin’s concept of civil society as they bring issues to 
the public and political agenda which would otherwise remain suppressed 
(Salmenniemi, 2010).   This has led to the emergence of human rights organisations 
which can be broadly placed into three categories. The first is ‘marionette groups’ or 
government operated non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) which are created 
by the state in isolation from society. This is usually done in order to “legitimise, 
complement and support the state’s policy agenda and create the image of an 
autonomous and functioning civil society” (Crotty et al, 2014:1255).  They are also 
often created as a direct counterpart to independent organisations which already exist, 
and undermine the ability of the independent organisations to collaborate with the 
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authorities (Daucé, 2010:97). The second type are grassroots organisations, which are 
locally based, do not have paid staff and generally struggle to attract funding. The third 
and final group is traditional, professionalised organisations which are larger and 
retain employees, and office space but were reliant on Western funding in the past 
(Crotty et al, 2014:1255). Western funding of professionalized organisations also tends 
to mean international connections with other human rights groups (Henry, 2006:112). 
It is also the professionalized organisations which are the suffer the most from 
government repression, as they are seen as the most likely to represent a challenge to 
the government’s position, as they can use international connections as leverage. 
Transnational advocacy groups, such as human rights groups, which are centered on 
principled ideas and values, can utilize their international connections to lobby their 
governments when it is not possible for them to exert domestic influence. Therefore, 
domestic groups can encourage other international groups aligned with their values to 
lobby their government on their behalf. Keck and Sikkink label this the ‘boomerang 
effect’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:13).  In contrast, grassroots organisations, while 
sharing human rights ideas, tend to focus on local issues which can be beneficial for 
the government, and they largely remain isolated from international organisations 
(Henry, 2006:112).  
EMERGING THEMES 
From reviewing literature, it is clear that three key themes emerge while analyzing 
Russian civil society is made. Firstly, Russia appears to be a ‘top-down’ civil society, 
where the state remains the primary driving force in civil society (Hudson, 2003:214-
216). Therefore, the legal framework within which they operate becomes extremely 
important The government can control the existence of groups through policy and 
legislation which is enacted through the state bodies. Russia’s culture of ‘legal nihilism’ 
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has long been criticized, particularly in reference to NGOs where their work had been 
limited as a result. President Medvedev made some conciliatory remarks in 2009 
about relaxing laws towards NGOs, however this was not matched by action (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009). Subsequently it has been seen that increasingly restrictive laws 
have been passed in Russia which seriously constrain the ability of independent NGOs 
to work, and it has become clear that this is a strategic move to further incorporate 
civil society into the executive branch by weakening independent voices.  
Secondly the cultural aspect of Russian society “enters into any explanations of the 
dichotomy between general opinion and democratic practice” in Russia (Shomina et al, 
2002:245). The conventional view on Russian society is that it is “browbeaten and 
unable to play a meaningful role” (Javelline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010:173) and 
with “an almost infinite capacity to bear hardship” (Robertson, 2011: 41). While the 
2012 protests countered this view, it has been a long held opinion that Russian society 
has little interest in civic engagement. This has been attributed to the ‘social contract’ 
which was developed in the 2000s whereby economic security provided by the state 
was exchanged for the non-interference of the people in political affairs. Lack of 
interest in social organisation is often ascribed to a difficult economic situation and 
insufficient income to be able to engage in civic activities (Selivanova, 2003:6; 
Shomina et al, 2002:267). Social capital also becomes a key concept when analyzing 
Russian society and civic engagement. Originally a concept within sociology, it was 
Robert Putnam who brought the concept of social capital into political science and it is 
often believed to be a critical factor in a well-functioning democracy 
(Marsh,2000:184). Putnam defines social capital as trusts, norms and horizontal 
networks of civic engagement. Co-operation between “horizontal groups” generates 
social capital which can be then used to exert influence on the state (Rose, 1995:34).  A 
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strong civil society requires a strong level of interpersonal trust as it facilitates the 
ability of citizens to actively participate in independent associations and civic activism 
(Chebankova, 2013:20), yet research in Russia demonstrates that the level of trust in 
public institutions is historically low, as is trust in fellow citizens. This results in 
negative atomization and a preference for strong personal networks instead of 
engagement with the state.  
The final key issue which emerges is the question of Western influence on the Russian 
third sector, both through funding and through the exchange of information, such as 
training and conferences. The collaboration between the Russian non-governmental 
organisations and Western countries began almost immediately after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, and covered a variety of areas such as technical assistance, business 
loans and grants (Wedel, 1998:9). The impact of Western practices on Russian NGOs 
has been mixed. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that it remains a vital life source 
for many organisations who cannot secure funding in any other way. On the other 
hand, it has been seen to carry a neoliberal and colonial message which entrenches the 
superiority of Western practices and methods over the local knowledge and encourages 
the creation of elites and disconnects organisations from their ‘constituents’ 
(Hemment 1998; Hemment 2004; Henderson 2002; Henderson 2003).  While 
capacity building and grant giving is often promised to be neutral, it is sometimes 
unavoidable that there will be some reflections of political ideologies within it 
(Wendel, 1998:10).  As Henderson notes, many Western aid foundations made an 
active decision to channel funding towards groups based on the neo-Tocquevillian 
theory that civil society strengthens democratic forces. There was therefore a tendency 
to fund non-governmental organisations they believed would be able to strongly 
advocate pro-democratic reforms (Henderson, 2003). The Russian state has also 
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become increasingly concerned with the international funding of some Russian civil 
society organisations, resulting in the notorious “Foreign Agent Law” passed in 2012, 
requiring organisations who receive foreign funding to register as ‘foreign agents’.  
From the literature, the many issues which face human rights organisations can be 
loosely grouped into three areas of analysis: legal frameworks and government 
institutions, civic culture and society and finally funding. In addition, it appears that 
there is a clear timeline mapping the relationship between the state and human rights 
organisations.   Although the relationship between the Russian authorities and human 
rights organisations has always had its tensions, 2006 marks the beginning of a more 
strategized approach towards civil society. Particularly from 2012, the amount of 
legislation regulating non-governmental organisations has increased significantly. 
Thus, in assessing whether human rights organisations can continue to work in Russia, 
it will examine these three areas from the period 2006-2016. Having established the 
research question central to the thesis, it is now necessary to examine how it will be 
answered.  
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN RUSSIA 
Human rights organisations play a vital role in advocating and protecting human 
rights. They are often independent of governments to ensure impartiality in their work 
and therefore can be considered as a subsection of civil society. Human rights 
organisations work in the space between human rights norms and the enforcement of 
those norms in order to defend human rights (Marcinkutė, 2011: 54). There has been 
some contention about the validity of universal human rights, with some states such as 
China, stating that human rights emphasise the Western philosophy of individualism 
and are not compatible with cultural norms (Carey, Gibney and Poe, 2010: 25). 
Cultural relativity is an idea which has become increasingly prominent in Russia as it 
has increasingly sought to establish itself as a beacon of conservative, Orthodox and 
distinctly Russian values.  However, as Brown argues, the concept of human rights 
may have emerged in the West but this does not necessarily make it an exclusively 
Western concept (Brown, 2005: 700). Instead he suggests that human rights act as a 
code to delegitimize acts which are universally unacceptable such as genocide (Brown, 
2005: 700). Furthermore, it can be seen that there is a grassroots demand for 
protection and implementation of human rights as groups and defenders begin to 
emerge in hostile countries such as Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Russia’s own human 
rights groups are diverse and exist at a grassroots level and at a professional level. 
Claude Welch outlines four areas where human rights organisations have traditionally 
focused. These are standard setting; researching and disseminating information about 
human rights abuses; lobbying officials and media; and providing direct assistance to 
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victims of human rights abuses (Welch, 2001:3). While it is a state’s obligation to meet 
any ratified human rights treaties, without the information and insight provided by 
local human rights organisations, implementation of those rights would be very 
difficult. Korey notes that the “overwhelming bulk of the credible and reliable 
information [on human rights abuses] has been and is provided by NGOs” (Korey, 
1998: 259). Human rights organisations therefore perform an important role as 
impartial watchdogs and provide information on human rights violations not only to 
their respective states but also to international NGOs such as Amnesty International, 
and international bodies such as the United Nations.  
The Russian Constitution contains provisions for the protection of human rights, 
which “will be provided according to the universally recognized principles and norms 
of international law and according to the present Constitution” (Article 17, Russian 
Constitution).  In addition to constitutional protection of human rights, the Russian 
Federation has signed and ratified a number of international human rights treaties and 
European conventions (University of Minnesota, 2008). While Russia is formally and 
legally bound to a number of different human rights legislation, it has a patchy track 
record of enforcing and protecting those human rights. Civil Rights Defender assert 
that a number of human rights are under pressure in Russia, including the right to life 
and physical security, the right to freedom of expression and the right to protection 
from discrimination (Civil Rights Defenders, 2015).  
This pressure is extended to many human rights organisations which work in Russia, 
particularly those which are critical of the government. It should be noted that human 
rights are a broad sphere and Russia’s human rights organisations reflect this. This 
means that there a variety of human rights organisations which focus on a number of 
different issues focusing from children’s’ rights to judicial rights. However, this thesis 
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intends to focus on those organisations which find it increasingly difficult to work in 
Russia, and therefore related to the more controversial issues in Russia which are 
often at odds with the desires and actions of the state, such as freedom of expression, 
protection for minority groups and torture and ill-treatment. 
CASE STUDIES: THE UNION OF COMMITTEE OF SOLDIERS’ MOTHERS AND THE 
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 
I focused on two organisations: The Union of Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers and the 
Committee Against Torture. These organisations provided a number of interesting 
differences. The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers is a well-established organization 
based in Moscow, but with regional branches throughout Russia. The Union of the 
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers (UCSM) was established in 1989 and works to 
establish human rights abuses within the Russian military and helps provide legal aid 
to soldiers and their families to raise awareness of their rights. Peacetime deaths 
among Russian conscripts are estimated to be as high as five thousand each year, 
which are primarily attributed to beatings, intolerable living conditions, denial of 
medical treatment and excessive labour (Sundstrom 2006: 62). Most recently, the 
UCSM has worked to provide information about Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine, 
helping to document deployments to the border as well as piecing together 
information relating to dead and injured servicemen as the Russian government 
refuses to disclose such information (The Guardian, 2014). The UCSM has publicly 
criticized authorities clamp down on information regarding military involvement in 
Ukraine and other military practices such as hazing and abuse by superiors. The 
UCSM enjoys fairly widespread public support as a result of conscription in Russia, 
and therefore are a highly relevant organization for many families all over Russia with 
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a predicted 150,000 young men conscripted per year (Daucé, 1997:133; Braw,2015). In 
2014, the St Petersburg chapter of the organization was designated as a foreign agent.  
The Committee Against Torture (CAT) is a more recent organization which is based in 
Nizhny Novgorod. Like the UCSM, the Committee Against Torture had regional offices 
throughout Russia, including in Grozny, though its main base was in Nizhny 
Novgorod. The Committee Against Torture provides professional legal and medical aid 
to torture victims in Russia. For its clients, the CAT uses public investigation lawyers 
to conduct an independent investigation and build legal cases in order to prosecute.  
Their website claims that their work has led to 111 officials being sentenced, and that 
they had 1908 applications for their help (Committee Against Torture, no date). The 
CAT was designated a ‘foreign agent’ and was forced to declare bankruptcy after fines 
were levied against it by the government.  It was eventually dissolved despite attempts 
to work around legal restrictions. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In this thesis, I have gathered limited empirical evidence to support wider patterns 
which have emerged from the research. The convergence of time and practicalities 
resulted in conducting questionnaires with two organisations. In order to better 
identify trends and patterns, it would be better to conduct in depth face-to-face 
interviews with a larger number of organisations and use participation observation 
over time to establish a good level of trust and, in turn, yield better data. However, 
practicalities would make this approach too difficult.  I initially identified a number of 
human rights organisations, mostly from my own knowledge of the human rights 
sector in Russia. I wanted to ensure that the organisations I contacted were Russian- 
created and Russian-led. I purposefully focused on these as including larger non-
governmental organisations which were Western in origin such as Amnesty 
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International and Human Rights Watch, would undoubtedly yield interesting results, 
but would also distort my overall picture. Despite having regional offices in Moscow 
and therefore understanding the working environment, these multi-national 
organisations are ultimately able to rely on much larger networks and resources than 
many Russian-led organisations and therefore their experiences would be much more 
different. 
I undertook test Skype interviews to confirm the practicality of conducting interviews 
but discovered that Skype was not the best method. This was due to several factors. 
One was the interminable issue of good internet connection. The second was recording 
the conversation for reference in the future. Despite attempts, the recording software 
did not work due to different firewalls in Russia. The final reason was my capabilities 
in Russian. Although I understood most of what was being said, my Russian is not at a 
level which enabled me to have the kind reflexivity necessary to conduct an in-depth 
interview.  
I therefore decided on using email correspondence and a loosely structured set of 
questions.  This meant that it offered some flexibility for participants in answering and 
the chance to reflect more deeply on the questions asked than would be possible 
during an online conversation. However, a drawback would be not being able to gauge 
tonal inflections or body language. For example, the participant from Committee for 
Soldiers’ Mothers seemed reluctant to answer questions regarding funding, and several 
times asked me to restate my research question and what, precisely, I was trying to 
find out and establish about human rights organisations in Russia. Of course, there are 
a number of reasons which could explain this cautiousness.  However, it felt that the 
participant was trying to tread a line which would not be able to be interpreted as 
being too critical of the government’s position. In contrast to the answers from the 
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Committee Against Torture, which were particularly detailed, reflective on their 
experiences and also heavily critical of the current position of the government, the 
Union of Committee for Soldiers’ Mothers gave neutral answers which focused on the 
positive effects of the organization and were very short. Despite this, I believe that both 
organisations have offered insights into how human rights organisations work in 
Russia today and provide necessary empirical information to corroborate larger 
patterns which have been observed by other academics.  
In addition to using the information gathered through correspondence, I have also 
used existing literature on human rights organisations, civil society and other activist 
organisations such as environmental and women’s rights groups. Several academics 
have conducted their own field research with organisations all over Russia. I 
acknowledge that my own research based on two cases is limited. I therefore will 
utilize a mixed methods approach, using secondary literature to establish patterns and 
using the primary research to corroborate those trends to answer the research 
question. The literature review and methodology have established what is known 
about Russian civil society, common issues that have emerged and which methods will 
be used to answer the research question. It is now time to begin analyzing the three 
areas of interest, the first of which will explore the civic space and the legal framework 
which shapes the extent to which human rights organisations can work in Russia.  
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Chapter Three: Narrowing the civic space 
 
This chapter will focus on how the third sector is shaped by the Russian state. The 
common discourse when analysing the activist space in Russia is that the space where 
NGOs can operate freely is becoming much more restricted and more difficult to 
navigate, particularly since 2006. Both Richter and Evans note that under Putin, the 
Kremlin has been seeking to integrate Russian civil society into the Russian executive 
branch, and to use it to provide the regime with information regarding issues it can 
utilize to achieve its own political objectives (Richter 2009, Evans 2008).  As will be 
elucidated in this chapter, the state is encouraging a civil society, but one which is 
narrowly demarcated. Therefore, only those organisations whose activities are deemed 
legitimate by the state are able to participate in the civic space. However, those 
organisations which find themselves outside of the boundaries, often human rights 
organisations which are critical of the government, are not able to participate in 
Russian civil society on the same terms. The thesis will first examine the areas where 
there has been limited co-operation between the state and society with the creation of 
the Public Chamber and the Presidential Council on Human Rights. While the 
introduction of the Public Chamber and the Presidential Council on Human Rights can 
be seen to be part of Russia’s attempts to adopt democratic practices, the Russian state 
remains largely unresponsive to these institutions. It will then move on to detail how 
the state has restricted the ability of human rights organisations to work through 
increasingly intrusive legislation. While legislation has been applicable to all non-
governmental organisations, it has had a particularly adverse impact on human rights 
organisations as they gradually fall outside of the lines of an acceptable civil society 
defined by the state.  Therefore, the space occupied by human rights organisations 
from 2006-2016 has become increasingly narrow.  
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CO-OPERATION: THE PUBLIC CHAMBER AND THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL 
PUBLIC CHAMBER 
In 2006, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation was created. After the creation 
of the Chamber in Moscow, regional chambers were also established in at least fifty-
five Russian political districts (Richter, 2008:7). The public chamber was seen to be an 
institution which would help to mediate between the state and civil society. President 
Putin proposed the creation of the Chamber (Общественная палата) in order to 
monitor the activities of state institutions and to work as an oversight committee, as 
well as supporting citizens’ initiatives and distributing government grants for civil 
society projects. It also has the ability to convene civic forums and hearings which can 
be used to gather information to help shape government policy (Richter, 2009:12). 
While this was initially welcomed by many organisations in the third sector as an 
opportunity to collaborate and influence state policy, the Chamber has achieved 
limited success in creating dialogue between the government and non-governmental 
organisations. The representation at the national and regional levels can be described 
as sporadic and varies widely from region to region.  
The structure of the Public Chamber means that it is heavily slated towards the 
authorities. As Hudson notes, the Civic Chamber was intended to create dialogue 
between NGOs and the government, which would lead to the construction of 
horizontal links among NGOs and thus strengthen Russian civil society (Hudson, 
2003:217). However, the nomination system has led to the Chamber being filled with 
pro-regime social movement organisations, as opposed to those who would be 
potentially more critical. Forty-two members are appointed directly by the President. 
These appointed members then select another forty-two members and together these 
eighty-four members appoint an additional forty-two based on nominations from 
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regional groups (Robertson, 2011:193). Clearly, these system of nomination is open to 
bias towards pro-Kremlin groups and thus creates a Civic Chamber which is largely 
toothless.   
In addition to the structural problems of the Public Chamber, it has also been noted 
that the establishment of regional public chambers has done little to build connections 
between the regional administrations and local civic societies. Richter has noted that 
regional activism varies greatly across Russia and often relies on the personal 
investment of those involved in the chamber. Therefore, often the “value of the Public 
Chamber is precisely equal to the sum of its parts” (Richter, 2008:12).  
Despite this, it is important to note that the Public Chamber has pushed back against 
the state on several occasions. This was notable during the implementation of the NGO 
law in 2006. The Chamber appealed against the Duma and pushed for greater 
scrutiny. However, the pushback from the Chamber could not stop the NGO law being 
passed. The Chamber has continued to voice its concern with legislation concerning 
non-governmental organisations but has not been able to successfully campaign for 
more progressive amendments.  
In addition, the Public Chamber developed a working group to deal with 
dedovshchina, a particular issue in the Russian army where new army recruits are 
bullied by senior officers often resulting in extreme abuse. The working group involved 
representatives from the Public Chamber, the Duma, the Defense Council, the 
Presidential Council on Human Rights and surprisingly the Union of Committee of 
Soldiers’ Mothers. The inclusion of the UCSM in the working group was unexpected as 
they had been openly critical of the government’s stance towards the issue of 
dedovshchina. The working group signified what the Public Chamber was capable of: a 
collaboration between state representatives and human rights experts to deliver a 
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report outlining the causes of human rights issues within the army, with the Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanonv agreeing to adopt some of the proposals outlined (Evans, 
2008:351).  
However, while the Public Chamber may have been able to exert some influence, it has 
been extremely limited. In the early days of its formation, it was able to fulfill its 
original purpose. Yet despite the apparent encouragement of greater public 
participation in civil society from the authorities, the Public Chamber and regional 
chambers have few resources or formal power (Richter, 2009:15). Instead it is often 
used as a means of gathering information on pressing social issues such as housing, or 
health care, or even forming part of the Kremlin’s soft power strategies abroad. In 
2013, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept document gave the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs a mandate to utilize the Chamber and NGOs to promote a positive image of 
Russia abroad (Lutsevych, 2016:4). When it attempts to contradict the will of the 
authorities or discuss more controversial human rights issues it is largely ignored. The 
Chamber has therefore been largely used to support the Kremlin’s vision of a civil 
society which is a “coherent, ordered space where individuals assist the state in the 
interest of the whole” (Richter, 2009:8).  
PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In 2004, Putin re-named the Committee for Human Rights as the Council for the 
Development of Civil Society and Human Rights and has been a point of independent 
analysis and lobbying. The role of the Council is to inform the President on the state of 
human rights and civil society in Russia and abroad. In stark contrast to the Public 
Chamber, the Council is composed of figures from a variety of Russian NGOs 
community, and has included some of the Kremlin’s harshest critics, such as Pavel 
Chikov from AGORA, a human rights organization based in Kazan (Presidential 
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Committee for Civil Society and Human Rights, 2015). While it plays only a 
consultative role in policy shaping, “it is widely seen as one of the most democratic 
institutions in the country” (Owen, no date).  
While it has provided an often liberal critique of the government’s policies, according 
to its own research, only five per cent of its recommendations become policy (Owen, 
no date). Since 2006, the Council has been accused of becoming a hollow institution 
which holds little power. Ella Pamfilova, a previous head of the council, distinguished 
figure in the human rights community, and the current head of Transparency 
International-Russia, resigned from her post in 2012, citing that it had become evident 
that the Council was no longer able to exercise its independence and that the 
authorities were more interested in bringing the council under state control (Radio 
Free Europe, 2011). Pamfilova’s resignation also coincided with fourteen other 
prominent members of the council resigning in protest against the re-instatement of 
Putin as president following widespread allegations of election fraud. The resignations 
meant that the Council was left with less than half of its original elected experts.  
The resignations generated some negative publicity and criticism from abroad 
(Bocharova, 2012; Stanovaya, 2012). While it demonstrated that there was some room 
for independence of opinion, it did little to alleviate the problems of the Council. New 
members to fill the empty positions had considerably less expertise, which made it less 
capable in its advisory capacity (Owen, no date). It has also been speculated that Putin 
took the opportunity to “pack” the Presidential Council with milder Kremlin critics to 
dilute the voices which had remained (Blamforth, 2012). Both the Committee of 
Soldiers’ Mothers and the Committee Against Torture acknowledge that while they 
have participated in the Council, there is little opportunity to influence the decisions 
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and that the Council acts as “consultative organ and decisions are not binding” 
(Interview Two, 2016).  
However, the CAT interviewee notes that it does, however limited, provide the 
opportunity to bring human rights violations to the attention to those in the “highest 
echelons of Russian power” (Interview Two, 2016). One academic writes that having 
access to the presidential administration is “the most valuable type of connection in 
Russia” (Evans, 2008:357). Thus while the advisory aspect of the Presidential Council 
holds limited influence and which the administration can choose to collaborate with or 
marginalize, it can serve as an important conduit which is not largely available to 
human rights organisations in any other form. Prominent human rights activists have 
acknowledged that the Council “was the only remaining platform for dialogue between 
the Kremlin and Russia’s civil society organisations” (Tétrault-Farber, 2015). Ludmila 
Alexeeva, one of the oldest Russian human rights activists and head of the Moscow 
Helsinki Group, returned to the Presidential Council in 2015 after resigning in 2012. 
While many have been supportive of her return, it is also considered by many to 
demonstrate that the Council is the only way to push a human rights agenda within 
Russia’s confined system (Tétrault-Farber, 2015).  
Both the Public Chamber and Presidential Council offer small pockets of opportunity 
for non-governmental organisations to collaborate and influence government 
authorities. However, both bodies lack real independent power and state authorities 
are able to adopt recommendations when it wishes and ignore those it does not want to 
consider. By minimizing the effectiveness of the two institutions, the Kremlin “creates 
a licensed civil society that is largely controllable by the state” (Robertson, 2011:214). 
Within the limitations of the Presidential Council and the Public Chamber, human 
rights organisations have struggled to be able to make their voices heard. As can be 
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seen, within both organisations, social minded organisations are more likely to be able 
to utilize the connections to the presidential administration that the Presidential 
Council and the Public Chamber offer. Human rights organisations, however, have 
largely been unable to use the institutions to effectively lobby.  
CONFRONTATION: LEGISLATION CHANGES FROM 2006-2016 
While the Presidential Council and the Public Forum have been limited in their 
abilities to affect real change for human rights organisations, they have been relatively 
accommodating within the structures of power and can be considered to be part of the 
democratic characteristics in Russia. In contrast, however from 2006-2016, the 
legislative changes in Russia have had a profoundly negative impact on human rights 
organizations and their ability to work effectively. Daucé notes that non-governmental 
organisations in Russia increasingly use legal channels as a means to frame their 
activism as this is the manner which is deemed “acceptable to the state” (Daucé, 
2014:248). Pursuing a legal argument for human rights abuses effectively depoliticizes 
human rights activists, presents issues to the government in the context of its legal 
obligations set out in the Russian Constitution and other agreements and thus makes 
“their presence in Russia public space acceptable” (Daucé, 2014: 248-250). However, 
the legal changes made in Russia has made this approach increasingly difficult. The 
NGO law introduced in 2006 and the ‘Foreign Agent’ law in 2012 with subsequent 
amendments has been used particularly against human rights organisations and has 
drastically changed the human rights community in Russia and the way in which they 
work.  
 
NGO Law 2006 
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In January 2006, federal law no-18-FZ was adopted and became widely known as the 
NGO Law 2006. The law introduced closer regulation of non-governmental and non-
commercial organisations in Russia, with a number of new procedures being 
introduced, including new registration procedures and a closer monitoring of NGO 
finances, including budgets and donations (Maxwell, 2006: 236). In its initial stages, 
the law was heavily criticized by a number of human rights organisations both within 
and outside Russia (Moscow Helsinki Group and Human Rights Without Frontiers, 
2009; Human Rights Watch, 2008) The concern was that the law would “increase the 
intrusive power of the state” and enable them to interfere with the work of 
independent NGOs (Maxwell, 2006:236:238).  
On the one hand, there have been scholars and practitioners who have argued that the 
introduction of the law may be beneficial for Russian civil society. Javelline and 
Lindemann-Komarova note that Russia’s NGO sector had been plagued by problems 
with financial mismanagement, corruption and illegal operations which contributed 
significantly to high rates of NGO liquidation (Javelline and Lindemann-Komarova, 
2010:174). Thus, they argue that the NGO law could help to limit such problems, and 
increase the professionalism of the sector. In turn, they also argue that this could help 
to build trust as NGOs become increasingly perceived as legitimate and trusted 
institutions (Javelline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010:175). Others have noted that 
Russia’s laws regarding NGOs are quite outdated; it was therefore essential that Russia 
modernize its statutes to regulate all non-governmental activities uniformly (Maxwell, 
2006:239). 
Yet some have also indicated that the perceived role of NGOs in the Colour revolutions 
in post-Soviet states was an incentive to increase regulation on these organisations 
(Crotty, et al, 2014:1254). The colour revolutions, particularly in Ukraine, unsettled 
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many of Russia’s political elite, and provided a powerful discursive framework within 
which to advocate for an increased control over independent associations which could 
potentially threaten the stability of the Russian state (Klitsounova, 2008: 8). Human 
rights organisations are often considered to be averse to the state’s interests and 
contradict its traditional values. It is therefore natural that it would be these 
organisations who would become the target of a law, which could be subject to broad 
interpretations.  
One key concern of human rights organisations was that the new registration 
requirements and documentation would be burdensome, particularly for smaller 
organisations, and that it would be human rights organisations which would be 
specifically targeted with not complying with the new legislation (Human Rights 
Watch, 2008). However, Javelline and Lindemann-Komarova argue that according to 
surveys and focus groups, new registration regulations have not “proven any more 
burdensome for human rights and advocacy groups than for other NGOs” (Javelline 
and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010: 173). While this may have been the case at the time 
of research in 2009/2010, more contemporary evidence demonstrates that this can no 
longer be convincingly argued.  After undertaking research with environmental 
organisations in industrial towns across Russia, Crotty et al findings suggested that 
smaller organisations were indeed struggling to navigate the necessary paperwork. 
This was because the larger organisations, which were also more likely to receive state 
funding, had the time and expertise to complete these forms (Crotty et al, 2014:1260). 
This effectively squeezes grassroots organisations from Russia’s third sector. While it 
is possible to remain un-registered, this places serious limitations on the ability of that 
organisation to work. It denies the NGO legal status and “essentially results in 
curtailing the group’s right to freedom of association” (Maxwell, 2006:250).  
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While at first glance, the issue of registration may seem insignificant, it has a heavy 
influence on how the Russian third sector is shaped. With smaller organisations being 
increasingly marginalised and unable to fully access support necessary to function, it is 
the larger organisation which are state aligned which will dominate. As Crotty et al 
writes, this will create a ‘managed’ Russian third sector “where NGOs are the agents of 
social policy, not the influencers of it (Crotty et al, 2014:1265)”.  
‘FOREIGN AGENT’ 
Perhaps the most controversial amendment to NGO legislation came in 2012 with the 
introduction of the ‘foreign agent’ amendment. Unlike the NGO law in 2006, this was 
perceived to be a full frontal assault on Russian civil society, and particularly human 
rights organisations (Human Rights Watch 2016). The law required all those NGOs to 
declare whether they were receiving foreign funding, and thus be deemed a ‘foreign 
agent’. The word ‘foreign agent’ is not neutral in Russia and holds Soviet connotations 
as a foreign spy and being designated as a ‘foreign agent’ can cause great damage to a 
NGO’s public image. A report delivered by the Presidential Council on Civil Society 
and Human Rights stated that the number of NGOs working in Russia has decreased 
by a third since the ‘foreign agent law’ had been enacted (Digges, 2015). Since June 
2014 the Ministry of Justice declared 122 groups as foreign agents and by March 2016, 
at least fourteen groups have shut down, with many choosing to shut, rather than be 
designated as a ‘foreign agent’ (Human Rights Watch, 2016).  
Russian authorities have often drawn comparisons between the Russian Foreign Agent 
law and other similar laws which are present in the United States (Maxwell, 
2006:238). While this comparison can certainly be drawn, it lacks the contextual 
background. Russia does not have the institutional capacity that the US does to 
maintain checks and balances on the implementation of the law. The Public Chamber 
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and the Presidential Council, as has been discussed earlier, can publicly criticize such 
legislation but are unable to influence changes. The foreign agent law can therefore be 
used and enforced arbitrarily.  
The selective nature of the foreign agent law is reflected in the further amendments 
which have been made. An amendment made to the NGO law of 2006 now extends the 
grounds on which organisations could be labelled as ‘foreign agents’. This now would 
include those who were engaged in ‘political activity’ which was vaguely defined as 
those organisations which was involved in publicly analysing government decisions, 
and any steps taken by an NGO to shape “social and political views and opinions, 
including carrying out and announcing public opinion polls or other sociological 
research” (Digges, 2016). In addition, in 2014, the Ministry of Justice was granted 
ability to register independent groups as ‘foreign agents’ without their consent, should 
the ministry consider that the organisation is engaged in political activity and receiving 
foreign funding (Human Rights Watch, 2016). As political lobbying and influencing 
policy makers in the areas of human rights is a key function of most human rights 
organisations, many are potentially at risk of being designated unilaterally by the 
Ministry of Justice as a ‘foreign agent’. In 2014, the Human Rights Centre Memorial, 
one of Russia’s oldest and most respected human rights organisations, was one of the 
first organisations to be placed on the compulsory list of foreign agents after the 
Ministry of Justice allegedly found materials on the organisation’s website which were 
calling for the overthrow of the government and a change in the political regime 
(McGill, 2015).  
Most recently in 2015, a law was passed in which any organization can be designated 
as ‘undesirable’ if it could be considered as threatening the state security and banned 
from working in Russia. Anyone working for an ‘undesirable organisation’ can be fined 
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up to 15,000 rubles for an employee, and 100,000 rubles for the organization itself. An 
undesirable organization can be both foreign and Russian. The George Soros Fund, 
National Endowment for Democracy, and the Crimean Mission for Human Rights 
have all been designated as ‘undesirable’ since the enactment of the amendment 
(Kozenko, 2015).  
For human rights organisations, the foreign agent law has perhaps had more impact 
than the original NGO law introduced in 2006. In more nuanced ways, the labeling of 
human rights organisations as ‘foreign agents’ subtly reinforces the Kremlin discourse 
of Russian traditional values against Western liberal values. Human rights are alien to 
Russia’s traditional values, they threaten Russian identity and ways of life, and are 
merely agents of Western governments who seek to weaken Russia. This can be clearly 
seen in the case of gay rights in Russia. Laws were introduced which banned the 
“promotion of non-traditional sexual relations to minors” and were justified as 
protecting Russian Orthodox conservative values, and ideas of the traditional family 
(Bennetts, 2015). As a result, many lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender human 
rights organisations have been unable to promote their organisations and have been 
effectively isolated from the Russian public and the government.  
From a pragmatic perspective, many human rights organisations receive funding from 
abroad and thus make them a prime target of the legislation. Ludmila Alexeeva states 
that she took the decision for the Moscow Helsinki group to completely cut funding 
from overseas as she felt that “I couldn’t ask my team to take the risks that came with 
the label of “foreign agent” (Alexeeva, 2016). For the Committee Against Torture, the 
‘foreign agent’ law has had an extremely detrimental effect, as in 2015 the organization 
was designated as a foreign agent. In order to try and carry on their work, the 
organization decided to re-form into two separate organisations: one which would 
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continue to engage with the work and ‘political activities’ and not receive foreign 
funding. The second would receive foreign funding but “would not be involved in 
activities considered to be political”.  Despite trying to create organisations which 
could continue human rights work in accordance to the new legislation, both new 
organisations were labelled as foreign agents. The interviewee laments that the label of 
‘foreign agent’ seriously damaged the image of the organization and states that “we had 
to destroy a brand which we had worked on for fifteen years”. Despite this, the 
participant notes that the Constitutional Court of Russia insists that the status of 
‘foreign agent’ does not affect the work of those who carry the label (Interview Two, 
2016). 
Despite the establishment of the Public Chamber and regional representation, as well 
as the Presidential Council, the civic space in Russia has become increasingly difficult 
for human rights organisations. The NGO law in 2006 marked the beginning of the 
deterioration of the relations between human rights organisations and the Russian 
state as it introduced more stringent registration procedures. However, it has been 
from 2012 with Putin’s re-election as president, where there has been a noticeable 
strategy in restricting the space where human rights organisations can operate. This 
has been in keeping with two of the Kremlin’s overarching policies: one to create a 
more uniform civil society which could be used to the Putin administration’s 
advantage, and the second to effectively delegitimize human rights organisations. The 
incrementally repressive legal changes since 2012 have made it difficult for human 
rights organisations to survive. In another interview, a participant noted that:    
“Civil society is systematically being destroyed from above… they are trying to build a 
civil society in a conformist and ordered fashion from above with no respect for 
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individual autonomy or the principles of democratic rule.” (Crotty et al, 2014: 
Interview 3.2:1263).  
SUMMARY 
Russia’s legal frameworks and government institutions provide limited opportunities 
for human rights organisations to co-operate with the state, and they often lack the 
power to be able to fully confront the state. Russia’s ‘lawfare’ approach to civil society 
organisations makes human rights organisations particularly vulnerable as the laws 
are often applied arbitrarily to those who are critical of the state. The state institutions 
that are available to human rights organisations are not completely open channels of 
dialogue. Both the Public Chamber and the Presidential Council offer limited access to 
the presidential administration, but it is the state which determines the terms of that 
relationship. Thus the civic space is Russia is becoming increasingly restrictive for 
human rights organisations, as they struggle to effectively make their voices heard and 
to influence change at the state level. At present there are 100 organisations listed as 
‘foreign agents’, most of which are human rights based. This can only be expected to 
grow in time as there are no effective mechanisms with which the human rights 
community utilize to counter these laws. Thus while a number of human rights 
organisations continue to exist in Russia, it can be expected for that number to 
decrease.  Unless legislation becomes less severe, it will slowly erode the human rights 
community in Russia as it limits their ability to hold the state to account, their ability 
to promote human rights without being portrayed as part of Russia’s fifth column, and 
their ability to garner international financial support to continue their work.  
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Effective activism: Culture and Structure in Human Rights 
Organisations in Russia  
 
While it is undeniable that the state authorities have embarked upon a legal and 
institutional to incorporate Russian civil society into the “vertical of power” and is a 
pivotal force in shaping how human rights organisations from the top, Russian cultural 
traditions and structure also profoundly shapes the attitudes of Russian people 
towards civil society, and civic activism. This chapter will be analysing a number of 
factors which influence Russian civic engagement and attitudes towards human rights. 
As it has been noted in the literature review, active participation in civil society in 
Russia has often been low. This low level participation has often been attributed to 
atomisation of society, low levels of trust in impersonal institutions, and a heavy 
reliance on personal networks. While this is certainly important, human rights 
organisations in Russia also have specific cultural heritage which influences their 
abilities to work in contemporary Russia. This is particularly rooted in the Soviet 
intelligentsia and the dissident movement, and the legacy of public opinion towards 
the idea of human rights.  These combined make it extremely difficult for human rights 
organisations to win public support for their organisations and create a coherent 
human rights movement in Russia.  
CIVIC CULTURE AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Cultivating an activist culture in Russia is difficult due to the state of civic culture and 
social capital. Civic culture is defined by Almond and Verba as the innate belief in one’s 
ability to influence political decisions and the political system. It also includes the 
belief that other citizens are trustworthy and can be co-operated with (Almond and 
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Verba, 1963). Countries which have a high level of civic culture often translates into a 
high level of participation of individuals through contributing time or money to social 
problems in their communities, and voluntary associations in particular are “often 
seen as a locus of civic participation” (Spencer and Skalaban, 2015:2). Russia, 
however, has a low level of civic culture and a majority of the population do not 
actively participate in voluntary organisations. Field research indicates that Russians 
often feel helpless at influencing the political system (Salmenniemi, 2010:322), which 
lowers the will to partake in civil society as it is often seen as not being able to achieve 
any tangible outcome. 
Social capital is also important to examine when analyzing levels of activism in Russia. 
Social capital refers to the ability to create horizontal networks between voluntary 
associations and civil organisations. These networks subsequently create trust and 
cooperation between citizens, and subsequently build impersonal trust (Newton, 
2001). Social capital tends to be very low as well in Russia, which has created an 
atomization in society. Rose describes Russia as an “hour glass society”, whereby the 
links between those at the top of the hour glass and those on the bottom are narrow 
and thus restrict the ability of individuals at the bottom to influence those at the top 
(Rose, 1995:36). This has created a society which looks inwards for survival; a trait 
which is compounded by Russia’s expansive geography (Rose, 1995:36). Many do not 
see the benefit of engaging with official institutions and withdraw from state-society 
relations, instead relying on strong informal networks to get ahead in life (Rose, 1999; 
Morris and Polese, 2014). These strong networks remain closed to outsiders and 
weakens “forms of generalised trust, and trust in impersonal institutions” (Ledeneva, 
2006:191). According to Shlapentokh, in 2006 only 10 per cent of people polled trusted 
the Duma and the Federal Council in Russia (Shlapentokh, 2006: 156). A fundamental 
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mistrust of formal institutions means that citizens are likely to resist engagement 
which in turn means that participation in civil society will remain low (Henry and 
McIntosh Sundstrom, 2006:309). 
Both social capital and civic culture provide important background knowledge for 
understanding the environment in which human rights organisations operate in 
Russia.  While Greene argues that the current disengagement of Russian society from 
civic engagement should be understood “to be circumstantial and contingent, rather 
than cultural and absolute” (Greene, 2014:10), it remains an important factor in 
cultivating activism in human rights organisations. Strong informal networks and lack 
of trust in formal organisations make it difficult to encourage involvement, and also 
create alienation from other groups and the ability for organizations to work together 
on projects (Rimskii, 2008:54). 
Spencer extends this atomization to human rights organisations in Novosibirsk and 
compares them to the Soviet kollektivs, where organisations are based on strong 
personal ties within small groups. Spencer notes that the kollektiv is inherited from the 
Soviet Union, but that civic organisations reproduce the patterns which maintain a 
“closed cellular type of society” (Spencer, 2010:1082-1084). During the course of her 
research in Novosibirsk, Spencer’s observations match those described by Mendelson 
and Gerber: organisations were usually conditioned by connections and leaders of 
those groups showed little interest in collaborating with other groups in order to 
achieve their aims, “nor letting strangers join or volunteer for their group” (Spencer, 
2010:1080). 
THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA AND SOVIET DISSIDENTS  
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When analyzing human rights organisations in Russia, an examination of the Soviet 
legacy is essential. The Soviet Union is still very much living history in Russia, and 
human rights organisations continue to be shaped profoundly by the “deep structural 
cultural legacies” of the past (Spencer, 2010:1076). This is seen in the affiliation with 
the Soviet dissident movement, the association of activism with the intelligentsia and 
the organizational structure of many human rights NGOs. The idea of the Russian 
intelligentsia has been transformed into a myth in the Russian consciousness and is 
highly symbolic in current society. Kochetkova summarises the myth of the 
intelligentsia as possessing unique characteristics such as intellect, ability to be critical, 
and holding progressive morals. It occupies a distinct social position which is 
separated from the power and the masses, and often perceived to fulfill special roles or 
missions. The intelligentsia identity is also symbolic of the struggle of a group against a 
hostile state (Kochetkova, 2010: 33).  
Human rights defenders in the USSR often identified themselves with similar moral 
values of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia: courage and integrity, defence of human 
life and a commitment to intellectual endeavour (Kochetkova, 2010: 25). Identification 
with the intelligentsia also served to legitimize their actions (Konchetkova). The Soviet 
dissident movement played a pivotal role in the promotion of human rights and 
founded many of the human rights organisations which exist today. The late 1960s saw 
the emergence of the pravozashchitnik, which is broadly understood as human rights 
defenders, and the movement to hold the Soviet Union to account through legal 
channels and provisions set out in the Soviet Constitution (Horvath, 2005:84). Key 
dissident figures such as Ludmila Alexeeva, Andrei Sakharov and Sergei Kovalev have 
played pivotal roles in the emergence of human rights promotion in Russia. Ludmila 
Alexeeva continues to be a formidable force in the human rights community as the 
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head of the Moscow Helsinki group, the Presidential Human Rights Council and a 
committed protester. Sakharov founded the Committee on Human Rights in 1970 and 
began the promote the legalistic perspective on human rights in the USSR, and Sergei 
Kovalev, who co- founded Memorial Human Rights Group, and the Moscow branch of 
Amnesty International, subsequently become Russia’s first Presidential Human Rights 
Commissioner under Yeltsin, pushing forward the first human rights orientated 
legislation in Russia in the post-Soviet era. Contemporary human rights organisations 
continue to be influenced by the Soviet dissident movement, which drew heavily on the 
Russian intelligentsia myth, not least because key dissidents in the Soviet era continue 
to be the ‘faces’ of Russia’s human rights movement.  
For many who were engaged in controversial topics such as human rights during the 
Soviet period, it was difficult to communicate such views to a broader public. The 
response was therefore to create circles with other like-minded people (Mendelson and 
Gerber, 2007:57).  These circles were similar to the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia 
which conceived of themselves as having a moral mission to educate and reform the 
Russian people. Yet while the intelligentsia were for the people, they were not of the 
people, and largely operated in isolation from the masses (Mendelson and Gerber, 
2007). This idea of belonging to an exceptional group has permeated through to 
activist identity in Russia today as they tend to identify heavily with this aspect of 
intelligentsia culture (Lyytikäinen, 2013:508). Indeed, according to a CSI population 
survey, only 2.9 per cent of the Russian population are involved in politically 
orientated civil society organisations (Yakobson et al, 2011:21), such as human rights, 
thus reinforcing the idea of human rights activists as an extra-ordinary group of people 
who are to act as the moral educator to the Russian public.  
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The tendency to remain inward-looking translates into a number of problems for 
human rights organisations. Firstly, as Mendelson and Gerber note, organisations can 
be reluctant to engage outside of their own group members and instead rely on existing 
members, and orientate towards those who are already converted to their message. 
This type of behavior is typically seen in leaders of more professional organisations 
who have received training and believe that they “know what is best” (Usacheva, 
2012:89). Thus rather than seeking to persuade public opinion and encouraging 
deeper involvement in human rights organisations, many instead “devote their 
energies to displaying the authenticity of their commitment to human rights norms” 
(Mendelson and Gerber, 2007:51).  
In the previous chapter, it could be seen how the state was working to isolate human 
rights organisations from power structures through legislation and selectively working 
with some groups over others. However, as Daucé chronicles, the dissident practices of 
being anti-political of human rights organisations have also contributed to the 
isolation of human rights groups. The dissident movement was rooted in protest 
against the Soviet party system, and was non-political in its nature. Apoliticism was a 
protest against the Communist party and a refusal to endorse the regime (Daucé, 
2010). The gradual erosion of liberal party presence in the State Duma has presented a 
dilemma to human rights organisations. With no liberal representation in a position of 
power, human rights organisations have faced the decision to become involved in 
politics, which is directly opposed to the dissident tradition, or to boycott the system 
entirely.  
The Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers embarked upon a new political strategy 
in an attempt to gain power to further their aims. In 2004, they created the United 
People’s Party of Soldiers’ Mothers as a liberal voice but stated that they were “willing 
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to cooperate with any political party to achieve its goals” (Yablokova, 2004). This 
marked a significant break from the dissident tradition. However, it was largely 
symbolic as the party participated in local elections in Moscow, but it was unable to 
take part in further elections due to new legal requirements (Daucé, 2010:98).  While 
the UCSM demonstrated its willingness to engage in new strategies, its experience 
demonstrates the near- impenetrability of the Russian political system. Within the 
human rights community, there appears to be a feeling of helplessness as it struggles 
to find ways to influence policymakers in Russia. Many human rights leaders believe 
that in the position which there are “elections with no choice”, they can do no more 
than just observe (Kokorev, 2007).  Thus many human rights organisations are 
reluctant to engage or compromise with the state, instead basing their actions on the 
“perfect morality” of the intelligentsia by refusing to engage with the state system and 
withdrawing into circles of other human rights defenders (Daucé, 2010: 91) 
Thus, human rights advocacy has traditionally been associated with the Soviet 
dissident movement and as occupying a position in society which is outside the sphere 
of power and everyday society. The cultural practices of the dissident movement have 
contributed to the isolation that human rights organisations currently experience in 
Russia as they tend to position themselves activist to activist in response to the 
political situation. This limits their ability to connect with the wider public and 
encourage involvement in human rights.  
OUT OF TOUCH? 
A further issue for human rights organisations in Russia is the gap which exists 
between the organisations aims and values and the general public. According to a 
Levada poll in 2014, 68 per cent of Russian citizens thought it likely that human rights 
violations were occurring in Russia, however this does not equate into support for 
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human rights NGOs (Levada Centre, 2014). Firstly, there is a clear hierarchy of needs 
which emerges when Russians are surveyed on rights. Economic rights are frequently 
ranked as the most important, with access to free medical care and the right to work 
and fair pay being the most popular (Public Opinion Foundation, 2013). Civil liberties, 
such as freedom of speech are considered unimportant by the majority (Yakobson et 
al, 2011). Thus despite over two decades of work trying to root human rights practices 
in Russia, Gerber notes that the “Russian public appears at best indifferent towards 
human rights NGOs” (Gerber, 2016). A dichotomy in perception also exists between 
human rights organisations and ordinary Russians. In a poll conducted in 2014, 45 per 
cent of Russians believed that the human rights situation had improved, 33 per cent 
believed that it had not changed and 14 per cent believed that it had worsened (High 
Commission for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, 2015: 12). Only 6 per cent of 
those surveyed believed that human rights NGOs could help Russians protect their 
rights while 24 per cent believed that nobody was able to protect their rights (High 
Commission for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, 2015 :15). Only one per cent 
had asked a human rights NGO for help when they felt their rights had been violated 
with 40 per cent not reporting the violation at all (High Commission for Human Rights 
in the Russian Federation,2015 :15). The statistics gathered by the High Commission 
for Human Rights, and other polling centres demonstrate that there are significant 
differences in the assessment of the human rights situation by the public and human 
rights organisations (High Commission for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, 
2015: 12).  They also strongly suggest that human rights organisations in Russia have 
failed to reach out to the Russian public, as the vast majority feel that they cannot 
wield influence or that they are aware of the work of those organisations.  
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In addition to this, research suggests that activism is a heavily based on class. 
Salmenniemi notes that the economic collapse in Russia resulted in many highly 
educated professionals, many of them women, with a high level of social capital, facing 
unemployment (Salmenniemi, 2014:44). They quickly came to occupy seminal 
positions in the civic field. The class identity of activists has continued in 
contemporary Russia. In interviews with Oborona, a non-partisan civic youth group 
which promotes democratic values, Lyytikäinen notes that many described themselves 
as coming from “intelligent” families. In nearly all cases, the parents had attended 
higher education and worked white collar professions, and some families had a history 
of being involved with dissident movements during the Soviet period (Lyytikäinen, 
2013:505).  Although research on Russian activism has largely been based on women’s 
organisations and eco-activism, it is reasonable to suppose that such trends would also 
be applicable in human rights activism as all three are similar in many ways, being 
motivated by international values, the belief in the power of individuals in influencing 
change and acting outside of the government (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 2).  
The marker of class in activism is not surprising in itself, as many socio-economic 
studies demonstrate that the more financially secure and educated middle class are 
more likely to begin looking outwards and become more interested in securing political 
and personal freedoms (Fukuyama, 2013). However, in Russia the middle class is 
particularly small. The Independent Institute of Social Policy (NISP) defines the 
middle class as: being a home-owner, having a higher education or white collar job and 
sufficient financial security to afford certain life choices, such as schools. According to 
this definition, only 20 per cent of the Russian population constitutes as middle class, 
with 70 per cent of society “living in near or outright poverty” (Jenson, 2013). In 
comparison, it is estimated that around 50 per cent of the population in the UK are 
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middle class (Arnett, 2016). Thus if most activists tend to be middle class, it reinforces 
the distance between activists and ordinary citizens, who may not have the time and 
resources to become actively involved in human rights organisations and sets activists 
apart as belonging to a distinct social stratum.  
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Spencer notes that organizational culture “can have marked effects on the ability of 
groups to collaborate, how a group is structured and how it operates” (Spencer, 
2010:1075). Organisational culture in Russian human rights NGOs can be seen to be 
influenced by old Soviet attitudes towards volunteering and the use of personal 
connections in achieving goals. In addition, the NGO sector in Russia is still 
developing and for many smaller organisations, there is a serious “skills gap” issue.  
During the Soviet Union there was the practice of ‘forced volunteerism’ which were 
organized through the workplace and regulated by the state. Citizens were expected to 
participate in activities which normally worked to support the Communist party, or 
could face consequences if they did not (Henderson, 2002:140). The European 
Volunteer Center Report details that a particular voluntary activity was known as 
‘subbotnik’ was a day of unpaid work usually undertaken on a Saturday to contribute 
towards a public project or cause. An annual ‘Lenin’s subbotnik’ was regularly held 
around 22nd April on Lenin’s birthday (Ginga, 2010:7).  
It is argued that this experience of forced volunteerism has manifested itself as an 
unwillingness amongst the population to join volunteer organisations, or are 
distrustful of voluntary organisations which are not regulated by the state (Henderson, 
2002:140; Mendelson and Gerber, 2007:54).  In investigating corporate volunteering, 
Krasnopolskaya notes that subjects in the study were more likely to volunteer in a 
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project which was supported by their company as it signaled that it was a legitimate as 
it has been effectively authenticated by the corporate company, but remained 
uncertain of other non-profit organisations, as the philanthropic credentials were often 
questioned and participants were unsure where their time and donations were being 
funneled (Krasnopolskaya, 2014:10). The Charities Aid Foundation undertook 
research which demonstrates that only 2.4 per cent of Russians volunteered their time 
in 2015 (CAF, 2015), and in 2011 only around 7.7 per cent of Russians reported 
membership or engagement with associations, civil initiatives or other non-state 
organisations (Yakobson et al, 2011:17). However, paradoxically the majority of 
organisations rely on volunteers and 40 per cent of all civil society organisations in 
Russia have no permanent employees (Yakobson et al, 2011: 21), impacting the ability 
of human rights organisations to be strategic and consistent in their work. Both the 
Committee Against Torture and the Union of Soldiers’ Mothers rely on volunteers and 
have a small number of permanent staff (Interview One, 2016; Interview Two, 2016).  
This small amount of willing participants limits the impact of human rights 
organisations, as they are unable to garner the important public support when 
lobbying on key issues, and makes it easier for the government to disregard raised 
concerns.  
In addition, there appears to be a generational gap when it comes to volunteering and 
activism, with tensions between ‘older’ and ‘newer’ activists. As was stated earlier, the 
identity of the human rights movement remains deeply connected to the dissident 
movement; but there are also activists on the ground which continue to use Soviet 
tactics. Many retain a ‘top-down’ approach, and rely on the traditions of the Soviet 
period, with some believing that it is essential to bring back subbotnik in order to swell 
their volunteer ranks (Usacheva, 2012:89).  Adhering to the ‘top-down’ approach 
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means that the organization is centered on the leader, rather than on values or goals. 
The leader therefore defines the tactics of the organization as well as which allies are 
“acceptable” (Usacheva, 2012:89).  Therefore, connections between organisations can 
often be contingent on the good relations between two individual leaders. It is unlikely 
that co-operation would continue should that trust be broken or a personal 
disagreement arise. Therefore, the ‘top-down’ approach affects an organisation’s 
ability to build a coalition around an issue and negates the capacity to pressure the 
authorities. For newer activists who tend to emphasise a more participatory approach, 
the fear remains that the new organisations which are developing at the grassroots 
level will simply be remade in the style of the previous ones (Sperling, 2001:1167).  
Personal connections and patrimonial practices have also come to play an important 
role in how NGOs work in Russia. The use of personal connections in the business and 
political sphere have been written about extensively (see Ledeneva, 1998; Ledeneva 
2006.). These networks are infused with power and create “effective yet illegitimate 
shortcuts that undermine the efficiency and legitimacy of formal institutional 
channels” (Ledeneva, 2006: 214). However, in the NGO sector, personal connections 
with the authorities are largely considered to be “the most efficient way to exert 
influence, gain access to public resources and further organisations’ goals” 
(Salmenniemi, 2010: 323).  The use of personal connections as a strategy is 
compounded by the weakness of Russian formal institutions, which makes Western 
strategies of lobbying impractical (Sperling, 2001:1172). As Melinkova from the 
Soldiers’ Mothers Committee states “there are no real laws, the system is pernicious. 
Only personal contacts are important” (Daucé,2010:92). These clientelistic practices 
can be also be connected to the hybridity of Russia’s political regime.  When the state 
cannot, or will not, guarantee a fair playing field for civil society organisations and has 
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weak democratic institutional capacity, it can be argued that this drives organisations 
to utilize other tools, such as personal connections, in order to get ahead.  
However, personal connections are not just important in gaining influence with the 
authorities. Spencer notes that many local civic organisations that she observed in 
Novosibirsk were based on pre-existing friendships or connections to the elite. As was 
noted earlier, the chaos of the 1990s saw a number of people with high levels of social 
capital facing unemployment and uncertainty. Salmenniemi observes that many 
recognized that those personal networks could be transformed into economic capital 
by way of registering an organisations and winning donor contributions and 
government funding and essentially a way of creating self-employment (Salmenniemi, 
2014:44).  
The extensive use of personal connections in Russia can be seen as a key cause to 
obstructing the development of the NGO sector. Firstly, the use of informal 
connections impedes the institutionalisation of NGO practices such as lobbying. 
Secondly it impedes the meritocratic development within an NGO’s organizational 
structure, and in the NGO network as a whole. On an activist level, an individual with 
better social capital will be privileged over an activist with more experience or 
knowledge. Within the network, it subverts the formal channels and creates an uneven 
playing field for other organisations which may not have such high levels of social 
capital. This can be seen in the disparities in regional development of NGO, relying on 
fewer resources and connections than those in Moscow or St Petersburg (Buxton and 
Konovalova, 2012:9). It can therefore be argued that the use of personal connections in 
NGOs contributes to a circle of a few organisations which are able to leverage 
connections to gain access to resources and further their goals. However, smaller and 
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perhaps more controversial organisations are unable to win patronage in such a 
system.  
SKILLS GAP 
The final aspect of cultivating activism in Russia relates to the “skills gap” which has 
emerged in Russia’s third sector. In the early years of capacity building and 
collaboration between Western practitioners and Russian activists, the greatest 
demand came for skills such as “techniques for speaking in groups, forming networks 
around a concrete issue, and thinking strategically at the grassroots level about specific 
actions” (Sperling, 2001:1172). While there has been significant development in the 
NGO sector, since the 1990s, training and activism skills remain a key issue within 
Russian NGO organisations and subsequently, human rights organisations. What has 
emerged is that many organisations rely on old habits and tactics and are reluctant to 
embrace new practices. Based on working with human rights organisations in Russia, 
Mendelson and Gerber note that many were unwilling to adopt social marketing 
strategies which would frame human rights campaigns in accordance to polling 
information, and thus in a way which the Russian public would find more stimulating. 
Social movement theorists have termed this “frame resonance”, which remains critical 
to the success of a movement or campaign. For example, the Chechen war would no 
longer be framed as human rights abuses committed against the local Chechen 
population, which many Russians felt ambivalent about, but instead focus on how the 
war impacted on Russian soldiers and particularly the number of soldiers’ deaths. 
Social marketing required many of the organisations to completely transform their 
previous approaches and make more strategic and concerted efforts to reach beyond 
those who were already familiar and supportive of similar movements. Mendelson and 
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Gerber noted that the reluctance to adopt this new strategy was typical of older 
activists and led them to conclude that  
“the human rights movement in Russia faces a demographic and 
methodological crisis: either younger voices, new strategies and innovative techniques 
will multiply or the movement will simply perish” (Mendelson and Gerber, 2007:73).  
The combination of traditional ‘top-down’ approach in human rights organisations and 
a reliance on using personal connections to achieve goals has seemingly created a 
human rights ‘elite’ which is profoundly influenced by Soviet habits, and which 
displays “few relevant skills and no experience communicating with the public” 
(Mendelson and Gerber, 2007:55). The Committee Against Torture particularly noted 
that leaders in the human rights sector and did not have a sufficient resources 
regarding social media which impacted their communications. (Interview Two, 2016). 
A dependence on existing practices and habits which are unique in Russia reinforces 
the existing structures and shapes organisations in unanticipated directions (Spencer, 
2010:1081).   
SUMMARY 
It can be seen that analysis of Russia’s society involves a number of complex variables 
which influence how human rights organisations work in Russia. The legacy of the 
Soviet Union has deeply affected the ways in which individuals in society relate to each 
other, and expectations of the state-society relationship. Russia’s civic culture and low 
social capital severely restrain the capabilities of human rights organisations.  
Experiences of forced volunteerism and closed networks make it difficult for human 
rights organisations to reach the Russian public with their message and so are unlikely 
to be able to build their power base and hold influence.  
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However, while the wider cultural issues are important, it is also vital to note the ways 
in which human rights organisations reproduce negative patterns within their 
organisations. Of course, there are exceptional human rights organisations in Russia 
which work tirelessly to build bridges between themselves, the state and the 
individual. However, there are also some fundamental issues that need to be addressed 
if they are to become effective in their fields.  By relying on closed networks and facing 
inwards, human rights organisations isolate themselves even more from their 
constituents.  From a strategic point of view, this makes it difficult for the 
organisations to “convert their claims and agendas into messages that resonate with 
norms which are already widely accepted by Russians” (Klitsounova, 2008:5). This 
means that their ability to “moderate the Russian government or mobilize the 
population will remain marginal” (Mendelson and Gerber, 2007:51:53). In addition, by 
engaging in clientelistic practices, the small space which is available for human rights 
organisations to work in becomes even more restrictive as it will become dominated by 
those organisations which are considered to be ‘safe’ and can utilize networks to 
achieve their aims, or those which are fortunate to have connections. Finally, 
Mendelson and Gerber argue that it is imperative that human rights organisations 
adopt new and innovative strategies in order to make their voices heard, instead of 
relying on old methods. Without key leadership and communication skills, Russian 
human rights organisations cannot effectively push forward their agendas. This is 
particularly important in a hybrid regime where the space to work is limited, but also 
because it is possible that a miss-step can see that organization fall victim to the 
numerous pieces of legislation which regulate civil society.  
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Funding 
 
Thus far, we have examined both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ influences on the ability 
of human rights organisations to work in Russia. Connecting both of these chapters, 
and the final area of analysis of these thesis, is funding. Securing funding is often a 
priority for any non-governmental organization, as it is essential in enabling it to 
continue its work. In larger, more corporate NGOs, whole departments are dedicated 
to finding funding for their organization. While this is often challenging for even 
experienced NGOs, in Russia there are a number of factors which make securing 
funding even more difficult, particularly for human rights organisations. While there 
are genuine arenas for opposition to the state in a hybrid regime, it is unlikely that the 
state will fund those organisations which are critical of the regime and which threaten 
its position of power, or encourage others to help sustain organisations it may deem as 
a threat. Since 2006, it is possible to see that the Russian government has engaged in a 
strategy of restricting international funding while simultaneously increasing state 
support ensures a diversion of resources away from “adversaries” and maintaining an 
image of a functioning civil society. First and foremost, it will look broadly at foreign 
funding in Russia, particularly from the US and Europe and examine some of the ways 
which is has positively and negatively affected NGOs in Russia. It will then look 
specifically at the state attempts to regulate the funding of human rights organisations, 
which is fundamentally linked to the ‘foreign agent’ law which was discussed in detail 
in chapter one.  It will also examine the ways in which the government provides public 
funds through the Public Chamber. It will conclude by looking at local funding as a 
means for human rights organisations to secure financial support for their 
organisations.  
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FUNDING HUMAN RIGHTS 
Human rights are considered to be universal in their nature and organisations which 
are centered on protecting and promoting human rights are thoroughly transnational 
in nature. This has led to a considerable number of international organisations 
financially supporting human rights organisations in Russia. In the early years after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign funding for non-governmental organisations 
poured into Russia, both from government agencies, particularly from the United 
State, United Kingdom, Germany and France, and multilateral organisations, such as 
the United Nations. They often had the broader goal of facilitating civil society, and 
ultimately democracy (Henderson, 2003:63). The funding which came from abroad in 
these formative years provided much needed funds for many organisations; 
Henderson notes that “many groups did not have money to buy paper, let alone the 
technology, such as computers, fax machines, and copiers that could expand their 
impact” (Henderson, 2003:64). In the nearly two decades which have passed, the 
financial support from Western countries has been extensively studied, revealing an 
extremely complicated picture whereby motivations and methods of donors can come 
into conflict with local organisations’ needs or create negative outcomes.  
The structures of grant giving have re-produced some negative patterns, as over time it 
has tended to favour a small number of elite groups. Firstly, in the early days of foreign 
funding, in order to participate, it was often necessary to have a knowledge of English. 
In the immediate post-Soviet period, very few members of the general public were able 
to speak another European language. Those that could tended to be old Soviet elites 
who had had the luxury of travelling abroad (Henderson, 2002:155). As grant writing 
became a professionalized skill in the third sector, it effectively concentrated the 
knowledge of winning international grants into the hands of a few individuals across 
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the third sector, and most likely those who came from a different social background 
than the majority of other Russians. In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that 
social capital could influence the ability of an organisation to lobby the authorities 
through leveraging personal connections; however social capital was also essential in 
securing positive financial outcomes for NGOs. Therefore, it was often ‘odni i te zhe’ 
(the same old people) who attended NGO conferences and seminars and built inside 
tracks of support through familiarity with the system (Sperling, 2001:1178). It is worth 
noting that many foreign donors have since made more efforts to localize their 
practices by hiring Russian staff and translating guidance manuals and others 
resources into Russian to improve access (Henderson, 2003:81). However, these 
earlier practices have carried long term consequences which leads to the third issue 
with foreign funding.  
As has been noted, budgets for NGO development in Russia can often be worth multi-
millions, and foreign donors are often paid from a government budget. Therefore, 
there is often a constant need to justify spending and to demonstrate results. This can 
lead to “constituency confusion”, where the interests of the donor are prioritized over 
the domestic needs (Rochowanksi, 2013) and create distance between Russian NGOs 
and their local communities as they will inevitably shape their agendas and projects to 
conform with the goals of the foreign assistance to successfully secure funding, rather 
than the other way around (Henderson, 2002:142). In addition, Western money tends 
to gravitate towards organisations which have already successfully delivered projects, 
or who they have worked with previously, as this is often easy for accountability and 
transparency purposes. Working with human rights organisations in Novosibirsk, 
Spencer notes that it was a small number of organisations in the region who managed 
to secure the majority of funding for their projects (Spencer, 2010). This is coupled 
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with the fact that despite the enormous amounts of funding from abroad, the demand 
in Russia is outstripping the supply, making international funding a particularly 
valued resource. Sperling observes that success in obtaining foreign grants often 
fosters feelings of jealousy among other organisations and can often be the cause of 
limited co-operation between certain groups (Sperling, 2001:1172).  The Committee for 
Soldiers’ Mothers highlighted in the interview an example of how another Russian 
human rights organization received funding from a Norwegian fund for a project 
which helped to train lawyers in human rights law. The interviewee noted bitterly that 
the Committee for Soldier’s Mothers had successfully been training lawyers in a 
similar way for a number of years but did not receive such funding (Interview One, 
2016). Therefore, many of the criticisms which have been levelled at foreign aid is that 
rather than facilitating the growth of civil society, and “fostering horizontal networks, 
small grassroots initiatives, and ultimately, civic development, foreign aid contributes 
to the emergence of a vertical, institutionalized and isolated civic community” 
(Henderson, 2002:140). 
Despite these criticisms, both academics and practitioners have argued that it remains 
absolutely vital for Western aid to continue supporting Russian NGOs, particularly for 
those which contest the state’s position (Alexeeva, 2016; Sundstrom 2006). Sundstrom 
argues that consistent support on issues will help NGOs to succeed in changing the 
domestic norms over time and thus help to create a dialogue (Sundstrom, 2005).  Both 
interviewees believe that foreign funding remains essential to the development of the 
third sector in Russia, even if it is flawed. Despite closing as a result of being labelled a 
‘foreign agent’, the Committee Against Torture also views foreign funding as 
unequivocally positive, and a way to help independent NGOs and develop the charity 
sector in Russia (Interview Two, 2016).  
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FOREIGN AGENT AND FOREIGN FUNDING  
As it has been previously discussed, state authorities in recent years have become more 
stringent on foreign aid to Russian organisations and have restricted the sources of 
potential income for Russian NGOs. While the ‘Foreign Agent’ law carries heavily 
normative penalties, it has a very pragmatic aspect as well. Some academics have 
underlined that the Putin administration is genuinely concerned that foreign funded 
NGOs in Russia could create a colour revolution similar to those seen in Ukraine and 
Georgia (Petrov, 2010; Crotty et al 2014). Putin has stated on several occasions that 
NGOs receiving foreign funding are simply instruments which serve “dubious group 
and commercial interests” which do not work in the interest of Russian people (Putin, 
2004) This cumulated in the ‘spy rock’ incident in 2006, when British intelligence was 
accused of making secret payments to pro-democracy and human rights groups 
through a hollow rock in a Moscow park. The ‘foreign agent’ law was introduced 
shortly afterwards (Topping and Elder, 2012). While the administration may hold a 
genuine belief that foreign funding poses a threat to Russian security, by restricting 
foreign funding the Russian state is also effectively weakening those non-
governmental organisations which openly criticize the government’s actions or 
promote an alternative discourse to the official one. Rochowanski writes that there is a 
belief that once foreign funding is restricted, many organisations which are critical of 
the regime will “simply deflate” (Rochowanksi, 2013). Thus the ‘foreign agent’ law is 
central in Putin’s conception of civil society being part of the “vertical of power” and 
drawing a line between those it considers legitimate and illegitimate.  
Despite the problems which have been outlined above, choking off foreign aid is 
having a severely negative impact on NGOs, and being labelled a ‘foreign agent’ carries 
wider funding repercussions.  The Committee Against Torture note that the legislative 
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changes profoundly affected their ability to finance projects due to their perceived 
image as an ‘undesirable organisation’. They note that many previous donors were 
reluctant to contribute to their projects and they were forced to find new partners, or 
shut down programmes entirely as a result (Interview Two, 2016).  In 2013, the 
Committee Against Torture received over 44 million rubles in foreign grants, from long 
term Swedish partner Civil Rights Defenders to the United Nations Voluntary Fund for 
Victims of Torture. Although they received 20,000 in private donations, they received 
no financial support from the Russian authorities (Committee Against Torture, 2013), 
subsequently making it impossible for them to carry on working without financial aid 
from abroad (Radio Free Europe, 2015). Similarly, the UCSMR received over 
$200,000 from the Swiss government, the Ford Foundation and the Right to 
Livelihood Foundation in 2004 (Sundstrom, 2005:427). The legislation has also 
caused a number of international foundations to close their doors as the environment 
surrounding international donations has become so difficult. This includes the 
prominent MacArthur Foundation and USAID, which since 1991 have disbursed $172 
million and $3 billion respectively in grants to Russian non-governmental 
organisations, including human rights organisations (BBC, 2012; Walker, 2015).  
In sum, the ‘foreign agent’ law has been a substantial blow to the human rights 
community. While organisations such as the Committee for Soldiers’ Mothers and the 
Helsinki Group may be able to survive without foreign funding due to their standing in 
Russian society, their size and their ability to work with the Russian government on 
some human rights issues that the state deems to be in their best interests, many 
smaller independent human rights organisations are likely to disappear as the foreign 
financial assistance shrinks.  
DOMESTIC FUNDING 
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Local funding is becoming an increasing focus for many human rights organisations as 
a sustainable source of financial support and with the current restrictions placed on 
foreign aid, many organisations now look to domestic funding in order to secure their 
activities.  While the practice of individual giving is increasing in Russia, it is directed 
towards specific charities and organisations, namely those which work with veterans, 
the elderly and children and the Russian Orthodox Church.  The Russian government 
has increased its state funding for non-governmental organisations, but this is also 
often directed towards socially orientated NGOs, and in-keeping with the Kremlin’s 
policy of creating allies and adversaries within civil society.  
STATE FUNDING 
After the implementation of the NGO law in 2006, the Russian government has 
introduced state funding, both at a central and regional level.  In 2006, the amount 
available was 500 million rubles, which increased to approximately 3.5 billion rubles 
in 2013 (Chikov, 2013). Since restrictions on foreign funding have been placed, there 
has been a development of grant programmes in Russia, which Daucé notes is 
“reflective of the Russian government’s desire to replace international funds with 
national ones” (Daucé, 2014:246). In 2015, it is estimated that presidential grants grew 
to 4.2 billion rubles (The Moscow Times, 2015), nearly a billion rubles more than two 
years previously and in 2016, 502 projects were chosen to be supported through 
presidential grants (Prezidentskiye granty, 2016). Presidential grants were initially 
distributed by the Public Chamber, but they are now divided up into nine different 
“operators” which cover different aspects of society, including youth, women and 
pensioners. Yet despite the significant increases in domestic state funding available for 
non-governmental organisations it has followed the pattern set out by the Kremlin as a 
means of control. Many of the recipients are ‘socially orientated’ NGOs, and projects 
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which are perceived to be beneficial to the state as they bolster social care where the 
state has previously been the provider. Many carry an emphasis on cultivating patriotic 
values through historical and cultural projects. The “operators” then award grants to 
different organisations based on submitted projects. In 2016, the largest grant of six 
million rubles was won by a project which aimed to provide free legal aid to socially 
orientated non-profit non-governmental organisations (Grant Portal, 2016). In 2015, 6 
million rubles went to ‘Khryushi Protiv’ (Piglets Against), a sub group of the pro-Putin 
youth group Nashi which targets the sale of expired produce in grocery shops (Grant 
Portal, 2015; Earle, 2013). According to the Center for Economic and Political Reform, 
other major recipients of government grants are the Moscow Patriarchate or NGOs 
promoting an Eurasian ideology (The Moscow Times, 2015).  
This is not to say categorically that no human rights organisations received 
presidential grants. The Moscow Helsinki Group won several grants through the 
presidential grant process, for projects which were focused on police reforms and 
general monitoring of the human rights in Russia (Moscow Helsinki Group, 2015). The 
influential human rights group Memorial has also been awarded grants for projects 
increasing awareness of human rights and increasing civic participation (Grants 
Portal, 2015). Both the Committee Against Torture and the Committee for Soldiers 
mothers received presidential grants in the past for projects (Interview One, 2016; 
Interview Two, 2016) but it is an uncertain source of funding which cannot be relied 
upon annually to support the work that human rights organisations carry out. In 
addition, the Committee for Soldiers’ Mothers notes that although there are large 
grants available, often the amount given is very small and not enough to cover 
essential expenses. The interviewee noted that the monthly rent for office space was 
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25,000 rubles, but the annual subsidy they received from the authorities amounted to 
28,000 rubles (Interview One, 2016). 
While clearly there are cases where human rights organisations have been able to 
secure state funding, the overriding belief is that the government finances NGOs which 
are “ideologically close” and those which “systematically criticize the government” 
have limited access to government resources (Interview Two, 2016). In a wider 
observation of human rights organisations in Russia, Crotty notes that the smaller 
grassroots based human rights organisations struggle to win government support, yet 
larger ‘marionette’ organisations, those created by the state, reported that the 
government had been “rather impressive and solid” and generally supportive of their 
activities (Crotty et al, 2014:1262).  
PHILANTHROPY 
Traditional philanthropy has long been an essential source of financial support for 
non-governmental organisations all over the world, as it often allows an organisation 
to retain independence from political influence. Historically, there has not been a 
strong ‘giving culture’ in Russia to independent organisations. Spero notes that in 
Soviet times “charity” held particularly negative connotations as it was “considered a 
demeaning, manipulative capitalist practice” and was therefore forbidden (Spero, 
2014:7). As with other cultural practices inherited from the Soviet era, this perception 
has been slow to change but it appears that there are steps in increasing philanthropy 
in Russia.  
Spero notes that many affluent Russians chose to establish foundations. In 1999 
Vladimir Potanin created the first private philanthropic foundation in Russia and the 
numbers have steadily increased including Mikhail Khordorkovsky’s Open Russia 
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Foundation. By 2006, there were over twenty such foundations (Spero, 2014:6). 
However, while these foundations have certainly grown in number, they mainly work 
in the parameters that the state has determined and are often unwilling to give to large 
scale human rights projects given the potential consequences that such an action could 
entail.  The Open Russia Foundation was forced to close in 2006 as a result of 
Khordorkovsky’s arrest and affiliation with political activities. It has since reformed, 
being re-established in 2014 and used to support educational activities, as well as 
political opposition in Russia through its Open Elections organization. It will be 
supporting political opposition candidates in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 
September 2016 (Moscow Times, 2016). Consequently, Open Russia Foundation has 
been threatened by the Ministry of Justice to be placed on its ‘undesirable’ list of 
organisations which are deemed a security threat in Russia (Novaya Gazeta, 2016). 
Khordorkovsky’s troubles with his Open Foundation has served as a warning for many 
other foundation executives who are unwilling to risk the existence of their 
foundations to support human rights organisations. In addition, corporate giving 
remains low as it is mainly channeled through foundations which has been set up by 
major commercial organisations. Businesses which do donate, tend to also give to 
those which are socially orientated and engaged in “conformist activities” (Chikov, 
2013). Chikov also notes that local businesses, when they do donate, prefer to give in 
cash and based on a relationship of trust between the two organisations. As he states 
“no responsible manager of an organisation can rely on such support for its core 
funding” (Chikov, 2013).  
Aside from large donations from foundations or corporations, individual donations 
also constitute a core part of generating revenue income. Again, individual giving does 
not have deep roots in Russian society, particularly given the economic conditions in 
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the early nineties where large proportions of the population were struggling for 
economic survival and had little disposable income. However, this has slowly changed 
and risen with economic growth. According to the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), 
nearly fifty per cent of the adult population donated money to NGOs in 2015 and total 
donations over the year amounted to 146 billion rubles, with an average donation of 
3300 rubles (Charities Aid Foundation, 2015).  The imposition of sanctions and 
stagnation of the Russian economy in recent years has impacted somewhat on 
individual giving. CAF statistics indicate that while the percentage of individuals who 
donate to charity has increased from 41.4 per cent in 2014 to 50 per cent in 2015, the 
amount given has shrunk dramatically from 160 billion rubles in 2014 to 146 billion 
rubles (Charities Aid Foundation, 2015). A final observation for alternative routes of 
funding is that newer methods of collecting funds is often difficult. In tracing giving 
behavior among Russians, the CAF research finds that Russians are often more 
inclined to give spontaneously, with the most popular methods being via text messages 
or through public donation boxes. Online donations are rare, and monthly giving 
through direct debit is also not a widespread practice, with only 5 per cent of 
respondents having used this type of donations (Charities Aid Foundation, 2014: 15). 
The trend in individual philanthropy is therefore broadly positive, but it remains a 
strong preference by individuals to support children’s organisations and emergency 
relief. In a survey, CAF observed that 66 per cent of respondents’ most recent 
donations were to support children. Only 3 per cent responded that they had donated 
to a human rights organisation (Charities Aid Foundation, 2014:16).  This supports the 
findings in the second chapter that human rights organisations do not enjoy 
widespread support among the Russian public and this is reflected in limited 
possibilities of raising money through individual donations. Despite this negative 
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outlook, the Committee for Soldiers’ Mothers stressed that the ability to fundraise in 
Russia was difficult as the “political and economic situation has taken a turn for the 
worse”, but nevertheless the organization has been able to fundraise online, collecting 
500 000 rubles (Interview one, 2016). However, it is worth reiterating the point made 
earlier that the Soldiers’ Mothers is one of the few human rights organizations which 
enjoys widespread support and recognition from the public due to its subject matter. It 
is unlikely that the Committee Against Torture or a smaller human rights organization 
would be able to fundraise a similar amount.  
ALTERNATIVE FUNDRAISING 
A small number of organisations have looked to more modern technology to generate 
income for their organisations, as NGOs have attempted to capitalize on the growing 
philanthropic trends. Crowdsourcing has become a ‘du jour’ method for many 
organisations to raise funds for specific projects. Navalny sought crowdfunding for his 
anti-corruption Rospil project, which raised millions of dollars from the Russian 
public while explicitly rejecting foreign support (Allen, 2013). However, Navalny’s case 
is an exception. It is estimated that an organization requires an annual budget of 
between $200,000-$500,000 to cover core logistics and staff (Chikov, 2013), an 
amount which is unlikely to be covered solely through private donations. Many NGOs 
do not enjoy the same celebrity status that is afforded to Navalny and thus limits their 
ability to garner widespread support for their projects. With a low level of public 
support for human rights, it is even more unlikely that human rights organisations will 
be able to garner enough publicity and interest to translate into significant financial 
support through this method. The Committee Against Torture specifically stated that 
their cause has “weak crowdfunding potential” (Interview Two, 2016). 
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Other methods that could potentially raise funds are often difficult to implement in 
Russia. An initiative proposed by the Ministry for Economic Development to allow 
charitable donations or membership subscription fees to socially-oriented NGOs 
through automatic teller machines was blocked by the Federal Financial Monitoring 
Service on the grounds that the donations may be used to fund terrorism (Chikov, 
2013). It cannot be clear whether there were concerted efforts in restricting the 
methods of donations to NGOs in Russia. However, that they are often treated 
suspiciously and perceived to be able to collaborate with terrorist organisations speaks 
volumes about the perception of independent non-governmental organisations in 
Russia.  
SUMMARY 
Russian human rights organisations face a minefield of challenges in the financial 
sphere. While foreign funding has long been a lifeline for many organisations, it has 
also created some negative consequences. This has contributed to the isolation of 
NGOs from their Russian ‘constituents’ and encouraged the creation of projects which 
Western donors believe to be desired, rather than being created from a grass-roots 
level. However, the strict restrictions now imposed on foreign funding has had a 
significant impact on how human rights organisations can work, and which ones can 
continue to work. Many smaller human rights organisations rely on overseas partners 
to fund projects which are not possible to fund in any other way. Therefore, despite 
being problematic in many ways, it remains a vital source of financial support. 
Restrictions on foreign funding appear to be a deliberate legislative move in order to 
constrain those organisations which are independent and critically minded and thus 
minimize the possibilities of a strong oppositional force emerging in Russia. By 
continuing to accept foreign funding, many human rights organisations risk being 
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victim of the numerous pieces of legislation which regulate non-governmental 
organisations, and possibly having to limit their work even further. Human rights 
organisations in Russia therefore face the dilemma of whether to accept foreign 
funding and minimize interaction with the law, or to try and abide by the legal 
framework set out by the authorities but accept that this will likely mean a reduction in 
the number and type of projects they will be able to finance.  
State funding is available in Russia, though only relatively recently and a small sum in 
comparison to the billions of dollars primarily goes to those organisations which enjoy 
close ties with the government and which work in the social sphere. Although the 
Moscow Helsinki Group demonstrate that it is not impossible to win state funding, this 
is an exception rather than a rule. As Chikov notes, the distribution of funds to human 
rights organisations by the state can act as a strategy to give the appearance of a fair 
distribution system, while ultimately distributing in an exclusionary manner. 
Organisations may then turn to alternative sources of funding, such as foundations or 
individual donations through other means. However, human rights organisations are 
constrained by the nature of their work. It makes them unlikely candidates for 
Russian-based foundations due to the state power and they do not enjoy widespread 
support amongst the Russian public. They are therefore extremely limited for financial 
sources, and many smaller organisations are struggling to finance human rights 
projects which are not considered to be beneficial to the Russian state.  
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Conclusion 
 
Human rights organisations in Russia today appear to be in a precarious situation 
where they may be able to survive, but will not be able to thrive. A difficult 
combination of punitive legislation, a poor civic culture and challenging environment 
to try and cultivate a strong interest in human rights organisations, and a restriction 
on funding sources but a state funding system which works to largely exclude human 
rights organisations creates unfavourable conditions for human rights organisations in 
Russia today. 2006 marked a turn in the state attitude towards human rights 
organisations as it became overtly aggressive in its attempts to control and regulate 
organisations within civil society. From 2012, it has become more evident that legal 
frameworks and other state measures are being used to create a civil society which can 
act as an auxiliary arm of the state, rather than a multitude of independent voices 
which campaign on a variety of issues. Given the evidence from other academics who 
have observed human rights organisations in Russia, as well as the primary research 
gathered from my sources at the Committee Against Torture and the Union of the 
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, it seems that the combination of legal frameworks, 
low level of activist culture and restrictions on funding make it increasingly difficult for 
human rights organisations to negotiate the labyrinth of the Russian environment and 
to continue working effectively.  
The severe laws which exist in regulating civil society groups are applied in an 
arbitrary manner, and state authorities are steadily stripping away the frameworks 
which support independent organisations. It appears that the Kremlin’s overall 
strategy is to create allies within civil society which it can use as extensions of its own 
power and use as “dressing” to legitimize the regime and bolster its democratic 
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credentials. It is doing this by amending and creating legislation which grant it more 
invasive powers and singling out those who do not comply. The Public Chamber and 
the Presidential Council offer the best options for human rights organisations to make 
their voices heard to the presidential administration, and offer the opportunity to build 
connections directly with those is power. However, they are weak institutions and do 
little for affecting change in the human rights sphere. In addition, these opportunities 
are only offered to a few and do not guarantee results. Therefore, the authorities 
engage selectively with organisations when it is beneficial for them.  
While the state has unquestionably created a hostile environment for many human 
rights organisations, it is vital to acknowledge the culture of activism which surrounds 
these organisations.  The civic culture of Russia compounds the ability of human rights 
organisations to create a strong voice. Russian society still suffers from low levels of 
interpersonal trust and relies on ‘pre-modern’ personal networks to get ahead in daily 
life. The emphasis on personal networks makes it difficult for human rights 
organisations to engage the public on a broader platform and encourage members of 
the public to join their cause. This is further complicated by the low level of support 
that human rights organisations have in Russia, as most of the public prioritise 
economic rights over civil and political freedoms. In any case, many do not believe that 
human rights groups can help protect their rights or do not ask for their help. In 
addition, a reliance on Soviet strategies and a ‘top-down’ leadership approach means 
that many smaller organisations are unable or unwilling to collaborate with other 
groups and activists, weakening their ability to exert pressure on the state either 
individually or collectively as a coalition. 
Finally, funding has presented a major challenge to human rights organisations. The 
state has increased it grant capacity but these are often distributed in a biased manner 
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while simultaneously dismantling the channels for human rights organisations to 
receive funds from abroad to continue their work. The research shows that human 
rights groups, such as the Moscow Helsinki Group, have received state grants. 
However, this is sporadic and usually only when connected to an issue which the state 
sees as beneficial, such as police reform. Philanthropy, individual giving and corporate 
support are still nascent in Russia. Particularly given the current economic situation 
and combined with the general support for human rights, it is unlikely that human 
rights organisations will be able to make up funding through these Western traditional 
channels.  
The combination of an unfriendly state, poor civic culture, weak support for human 
rights and the drying up of international funding has created a number of barriers for 
human rights organisations in Russia and it is a minefield sector, riddled with 
uncertainty. Given time and support it is likely that public attitudes towards human 
rights could be improved, skills within human rights organisations built up and 
sharing of new and effective campaign methods encouraged. However, the increasingly 
belligerent nature of the Russian authorities towards human rights organisations 
makes the environment nearly impossible for them to conduct effective and 
meaningful work. If the current legislation patterns continue and without significant 
relaxation of the current laws in place, it is likely that only a few of Russia’s larger 
human rights organisations will be left while regional representation will be all but 
extinct.  
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